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ABSTRACT 
 
An ad hoc network is the cooperative engagement of a collection of mobile nodes without 
the required intervention of any centralized access point or existing infrastructure. There 
is an increasing trend to adopt ad hoc networking for commercial uses; however, their 
main applications lie in military, tactical and other security-sensitive operations. In these 
and other applications of ad hoc networking, secure routing is an important issue.  
 
Designing a foolproof security protocol for ad hoc network is a challenging task due to its 
unique characteristics such as, lack of central authority, frequent topology changes, rapid 
node mobility, shared radio channel and limited availability of resources. A number of 
protocols have been proposed in the literature for secure routing. However, most of these 
protocols are either proactive or reactive in approach. Both the approaches have their own 
limitations, for example, the proactive protocols use excess bandwidth in maintaining the 
routing information while, the reactive ones have long route request delay.  
 
In this thesis, we proposed a secure hybrid ad hoc routing protocol, called Secure Zone 
Routing Protocol (SZRP), which aims at addressing the above limitations by combining 
the best properties of both proactive and reactive approaches. The proposed protocol is 
based on the concept zone routing protocol (ZRP). It employs an integrated approach of 
digital signature and both the symmetric and asymmetric key encryption techniques to 
achieve the security goals like message integrity, data confidentiality and end to end 
authentication at IP layer. The thesis details the design of the proposed protocol and 
analyses its robustness in the presence of multiple possible security attacks that involves 
impersonation, modification, fabrication and replay of packets caused either by an 
external advisory or an internal compromised node within the network. The security and 
performance evaluation of SZRP through simulation indicates that the proposed scheme 
successfully defeats all the identified threats and achieves a good security at the cost of 
acceptable overhead. Together with existing approaches for securing the physical and 
MAC layer within the network protocol stack, the Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) 
can provide a foundation for the secure operation of an ad hoc network. 
Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Motivation 
Objective 
Organization of Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In this new era of communication, the advent of mobile computing has revolutionized our 
information society. The proliferation of new, powerful, efficient and compact 
communicating devices like personnel digital assistants (PDAs), pagers, laptops and 
cellular phones, having extraordinary processing power paved the way for advance 
mobile connectivity. We are moving from the Personal Computer age to the Ubiquitous 
Computing age in which a user utilizes, at the same time, several electronic platforms 
through which he can access all the required information whenever and wherever needed. 
The nature of ubiquitous devices makes wireless networks the easiest solution for their 
interconnection and, as a consequence, the wireless arena has been experiencing 
exponential growth in the past decade [4]. 
 
Among the myriad of applications and services run by mobile devices, network 
connections and corresponding data services are without doubt the most demanding ones. 
Currently, most of the connections among the wireless devices are achieved via fixed 
infrastructure-based service provider, or private networks. For example, connections 
between two cell phones are setup by BSC and MSC in cellular networks; laptops are 
connected to Internet via wireless access points. While infrastructure-based networks 
provide a great way for mobile devices to get network services, it takes time and 
potentially high cost to set up the necessary infrastructure. There are, furthermore, 
situations where user required networking connections are not available in a given 
geographic area, and providing the needed connectivity and network services in these 
situations becomes a real challenge. 
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For all these reasons, combined with significance advances in technology and 
standardization, new alternative ways to deliver mobile connectivity have been emerging. 
These are focused around having the mobile devices connect to each other in the 
transmission range through automatic configuration, setting up an ad hoc mobile network 
that is both flexible and powerful. 
 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) sometimes called a wireless ad hoc network or a 
mobile mesh network is a wireless network, comprised of mobile computing devices 
(nodes) that use wireless transmission for communication, without the aid of any 
established infrastructure or centralized administration such as a base station or an access 
point [1, 2, 3, 4]. Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, mobile ad hoc networks do 
not rely on any central coordinator but communicate in a self organized way. Mobile 
nodes that are within each other’s radio range communicate directly via wireless links, 
while those far apart rely on other nodes to relay messages as routers. In ad hoc network 
each node acts both as a host (which is capable of sending and receiving) and a router 
which forwards the data intended for some other node. Ad hoc wireless networks can be 
deployed quickly anywhere and anytime as they eliminate the complexity of 
infrastructure setup. 
 
Applications of ad hoc network range from military operations and emergency disaster 
relief, to commercial uses such as community networking and interaction between 
attendees at a meeting or students during a lecture. Most of these applications demand a 
secure and reliable communication. 
 
Mobile wireless networks are generally more vulnerable to information and physical 
security threats than fixed wired networks. Vulnerability of channels and nodes, absence 
of infrastructure and dynamically changing topology, make ad hoc networks security a 
difficult task [4]. Broadcast wireless channels allow message eavesdropping and injection 
(vulnerability of channels). Nodes do not reside in physically protected places, and hence 
can easily fall under the attackers’ control (node vulnerability). The absence of 
infrastructure makes the classical security solutions based on certification authorities and 
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on-line servers inapplicable. In addition to this, the security of routing protocols in the 
MANET dynamic environment is an additional challenge.   
 
Most of the previous research on ad hoc networking has been done focusing only upon 
the efficiency of the network. There are quite a number of routing protocols proposed [5, 
16, 21] that are excellent in terms of efficiency. However, they were generally designed 
for a non-adversarial network setting, assuming a trusted environment; hence no security 
mechanism has been considered. But in a more realistic setting such as a battle field or a 
police rescue operation, in which, an adversary may attempt to disrupt the 
communication; a secure ad hoc routing protocol is highly desirable. 
 
The unique characteristics of ad hoc networks present a host of research areas related to 
security, such as, key management models, secure routing protocols, instruction detection 
systems and trust based models. This thesis work is based on the research done in the 
area of secure routing. 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Secure routing in the field of mobile ad hoc networks is one of the most emerging areas 
of research. Designing a foolproof security protocol for ad hoc routing is a challenging 
task due to the unique network characteristics such as, lack of central authority, rapid 
node mobility, frequent topology changes, insecure operational environment, shared radio 
channel and limited availability of resources. A number of protocols have been proposed 
in the literature for secure routing. A survey of these protocols is given in [1, 2, 22, 23]. 
Most of these protocols are either proactive or reactive in approach. However, both the 
approaches have their own limitations [16, 17]. For example, the proactive protocols use 
excess bandwidth in maintaining the routing information while, the reactive ones have 
long route request delay. Reactive routing also inefficiently floods the entire network for 
route determination.   
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In this thesis, we proposed a secure hybrid ad hoc routing protocol, called Secure Zone 
Routing Protocol (SZRP), which aims at addressing the above limitations by combining 
the best properties of both proactive and reactive approaches. The proposed protocol is 
based on the concept zone routing protocol (ZRP). It employs an integrated approach of 
digital signature and both the symmetric and asymmetric key encryption techniques to 
achieve the security goals like message integrity, data confidentiality and end to end 
authentication at IP layer. The thesis details the design of the proposed protocol and 
analyses its robustness in the presence of multiple possible security attacks that involves 
impersonation, modification, fabrication and replay of packets caused either by an 
external advisory or an internal compromised node within the network.  
 
The security and performance evaluation of SZRP through simulation indicates that the 
proposed scheme successfully defeats all the identified threats and achieves a good 
security at the cost of acceptable overhead. Together with existing approaches for 
securing the physical and MAC layer within the network protocol stack, the Secure Zone 
Routing Protocol (SZRP) can provide a foundation for the secure operation of an ad hoc 
network. 
 
1.2 Objective 
 
The goal of this thesis is two fold. 
  
 It aims towards suggesting, designing and implementing a highly efficient 
security solution for mobile ad hoc networks by establishing secure routing and 
effective key management mechanism.  
 
 The proposed protocol should be built upon such a platform that it is not only 
efficient in terms of meeting the security requirements like message integrity, data 
confidentiality and end to end authentication but is also cost effective and 
applicable in practical environment. 
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1.3 Organization of Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1, which is here, gives some introduction 
and motivation for proposing the Secure Zone Routing Protocol. In Chapter 2, we look at 
mobile ad hoc networking in closer details, covering their specific characteristics, 
complexities and design constraints. This is followed by a classification of existing 
routing algorithms in it. Chapter 3 examines the security issues and challenges associated 
with mobile ad hoc networks. In this chapter, we identify the different kinds of threats an 
ad hoc network faces and explore new approaches to secure its communication. In 
Chapter 4, we detail the design of Secure Zone Routing Protocol and analyze its 
robustness in the presence of multiple security attacks. Chapter 5 presents the possible 
implementation and performance evaluation of the proposed protocol through simulation 
work. We conclude the thesis in Chapter 6 with proposal for possible extension of the 
work done. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Ad Hoc Networking 
 
 
Mobility is becoming increasingly important for users of computing systems. Technology 
has made possible smaller, less expensive and more powerful wireless communicating 
devices and computers. As a result users gain flexibility and the ability to exchange 
information and maintain connectivity while roaming through a large area. The necessary 
mobile computing support is being provided in some areas by installing base stations and 
access points. Mobile users can maintain their connectivity by accessing this 
infrastructure from home, from the office, or while on the road. 
 
Such mobility support is not available in all locations where mobile communication is 
desired. Access points may not be set up due to high cost, low expected usage, or poor 
performance. This may happen during outdoor conferences or in emergency situations 
like natural disasters and military maneuvers in enemy territory. If mobile users want to 
communicate in the absence of a support structure, they must form an ad hoc network. In 
this chapter, we look at mobile ad hoc networking in closer details. We present their 
characteristics, analyze the complexities and design constraints associated with them and 
classify the existing routing algorithms in it. 
 
2.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET), sometimes called a wireless ad hoc network or a 
mobile mesh network is a wireless network, comprised of mobile computing devices 
(nodes) that use wireless transmission for communication, without the aid of any 
 9
established infrastructure or centralized administration such as a base station in cellular 
network or an access point in wireless local area network [1, 2, 3, 4]. The nodes are free 
to move randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily; thus, the network’s wireless 
topology may change rapidly and unpredictably. Such a network may operate in a 
standalone fashion, or may be connected to the larger Internet. Unlike traditional mobile 
wireless networks, mobile ad hoc networks do not rely on any central coordinator but 
communicate in a self organized way. Mobile nodes that are within each other’s radio 
range communicate directly via wireless links, while those far apart rely on other nodes 
to relay messages as routers. In ad hoc network each node acts both as a host (which is 
capable of sending and receiving) and a router which forwards the data intended for some 
other node. Hence it is appropriate to call such networks as “multi-hop wireless ad hoc 
networks”. Figure 2.1 shows an example of mobile adhoc network and its communication 
technology. 
 
As shown in Figure 2.1, an ad hoc network might consist of several home-computing 
devices, including laptops, cellular phones, and so on. Each node will be able to 
communicate directly with any other node that resides within its transmission range. For 
communicating with nodes that reside beyond this range, the node needs to use 
intermediate nodes to relay the messages hop by hop.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.1: A Typical Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
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2.1.2 Characteristics, Complexities and Design Constraints 
 
Mobile ad hoc networks eliminate the constraint of infrastructure set up and enable 
devices to create and join networks on the fly, any where, any time and virtually for any 
application. However, these flexibilities and convenience do come at a price. Mobile ad 
hoc networks inherit the common problems of wireless networking in general, and add 
their own constraints specific to ad hoc routing [2]. Some of the notable characteristics, 
complexities and design constraints of MANETs are presented below: 
 
 Wireless medium: In an ad hoc environment, nodes communicate wirelessly and 
share the same media (radio, infrared etc.). The wireless medium has neither 
absolute, nor readily observable boundaries outside of which the stations are 
unable to receive network frames. Thus the channel is unprotected from outside 
signals and hence it is significantly less reliable than wired media. 
 
 Autonomous and infrastructureless: MANET does not depend on any 
established infrastructure or centralized administration. Each node operates in 
distributed peer-to-peer mode, acts as an independent router and generates 
independent data. Network management has to be distributed across different 
nodes, which brings added difficulty in fault detection and management 
 
 Dynamic and changing network topology: In mobile ad hoc networks, because 
nodes can move arbitrarily, the network topology, which is typically multi-hop, 
can change frequently and unpredictably, resulting in route changes, frequent 
network partitions, and possibly packet losses. 
 
 Limited availability of resources: Because batteries carried by each mobile node 
have limited power supply, processing power is limited, which in turn limits 
services and applications that can be supported by each node. This becomes a 
bigger issue in MANET because, since each node is acting as both an end system 
and a router at the same time, additional energy is required to forward packets. 
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2.2 MANET Applications 
 
Ad hoc wireless networks, due to their quick and economically less demanding 
deployment, find applications in several areas [1]. Some of these include:  
 
 Military applications, such as establishing communication among a group of 
soldiers for tactical operations when setting up a fixed wireless communication 
infrastructure in enemy territories or in inhospitable terrains may not be possible.  
 
 Emergency systems, for example, establishing communication among rescue 
personnel in disaster-affected area that need quick deployment of a network. 
 
 Commercial uses such as community networking and interaction between 
attendees at a meeting or students during a lecture 
 
 Collaborative and distributed computing. 
 
 Wireless mess networks and wireless sensor networks. 
 
2.3 Routing approaches in Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
 
Since the advent of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) packet radio 
networks in the early 1970s [1], numerous routing protocols have been developed for ad 
hoc mobile networks [2, 5]. As shown in Fig. 2.2, these are generally categorized as 
table-driven or proactive, on-demand or reactive and hybrid routing protocols. 
 
Table-driven or Proactive Protocols: Proactive routing protocols attempt to maintain 
consistent, up-to-date routing information between every pair of nodes in the network by 
propagating, proactively, route updates at fixed intervals. As the resulting information is 
usually maintained in tables, the protocols are sometimes referred to as table-driven 
protocols. Representative proactive protocols include: Destination-Sequenced Distance-
Vector (DSDV) routing [7], Clustered Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) [8], Wireless 
Routing Protocol (WRP) [9], and Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [10].  
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Fig 2.2: Classifications of Ad Hoc Routing Protocols 
 
On-demand or Reactive Protocols: A different approach from table-driven routing is 
reactive or on-demand routing. These protocols depart from the legacy Internet approach. 
Reactive protocols, unlike table-driven ones, establish a route to a destination when there 
is a demand for it, usually initiated by the source node through discovery process within 
the network. Once a route has been established, it is maintained by the node until either 
the destination becomes inaccessible or until the route is no longer used or has expired.  
Representative reactive routing protocols include: Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [12], 
Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing [13], Temporally Ordered Routing 
Algorithm (TORA) [14] and Associativity Based Routing (ABR) [15]. 
 
Hybrid Routing Protocols: Purely proactive or purely reactive protocols perform well in 
a limited region of network setting. However, the diverse applications of ad hoc networks 
across a wide range of operational conditions and network configuration pose a challenge 
for a single protocol to operate efficiently [3]. For example, reactive routing protocols are 
well suited for networks where the call-to-mobility ratio is relatively low. Proactive 
routing protocols, on the other hand, are well suited for networks where this ratio is 
relatively high. The performance of either class of protocols degrades when the protocols 
are applied to regions of ad hoc networks space between the two extremes.   
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Researchers advocate that the issue of efficient operation over a wide range of conditions 
can be addressed by a hybrid routing approach, where the proactive and the reactive 
behavior is mixed in the amounts that best match these operational conditions. 
Representative hybrid routing protocols include: Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [16] and 
Zone-based Hierarchal Link state routing protocol (ZHLS) [21]. 
 
In the following sub sections we examine three protocols, the optimized link state routing 
(OLSR) protocol, adhoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol and zone 
routing protocol (ZRP), as they were found useful for the thesis work. OLSR and AODV 
fall under proactive and reactive family, where as, ZRP is a hybrid routing protocol.  
 
2.3.1 Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) Protocol 
 
The Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol [10] is a variation of traditional link 
state routing, modified for improved operation in ad hoc networks. The key feature of 
OLSR is its use of multipoint relays (MPRs) to reduce the overhead of network floods 
and the size of link state updates. Each node computes its MPRs from its set of 
neighbours. The MPR set is selected such that when a node broadcasts a message, the 
retransmission of that message by the MPR set will ensure that the message is received 
by each of its two-hop neighbours. Hence, when ever a node broadcasts a message, only 
those neighbours in its MPR set rebroadcast the message. Other neighbours that are not in 
the MPR set process the message but not rebroadcast it. Further, when exchanging link 
state routing information, a node only lists its connections to those neighbours that have 
selected it as an MPR. That set of neighbours is termed as MPR Selectors.  
 
The MPR set for a given node is the set of neighbours that covers the two-hop 
neighbourhood of the node, as shown in Figure 2.3. Nodes learn their set of two-hop 
neighbours through the periodic exchange of Hello messages. Each node periodically 
transmits a Hello message that contains a list of neighbours. Associated with each 
neighbour is an attribute including the directionality of the link to that neighbour. The 
node is labeled symmetric if the link to the neighbour is bidirectional, or asymmetric if a 
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Hello has been received from that node but the link has not been confirmed as 
bidirectional. When a node receives this Hello message from each of its neighbours, it 
obtains complete knowledge of its two-hop neighbour set at that point in time. Further, if 
its own address is listed in the Hello message, it knows the link with that neighbour is 
bidirectional. It can then update the status of that neighbour to be symmetric.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.3: Multipoint Relays 
 
The MPRs set may be calculated according to the algorithm [11] as follows. Each node 
starts with an empty MPR set. The N is defined to be the set of one-hop neighbours with 
which there exists bidirectional connectivity and the set of N2 is the set of two-hop 
bidirectional neighbours. The first nodes that are selected for the MPR set are those nodes 
in N that are the only neighbours of some node in N2. Next, the degree of each node n in 
N that is not in the MPR set is calculated., where the degree is the number of nodes in N2 
that are not covered by nodes in the MPR set, the node in N that has the highest degree is 
included in the MPR set. Once all the nodes in N2 are covered, the process terminates. 
 
Once each node’s MPR set is selected, routing path within the network can be 
determined. Because OLSR is a proactive protocol, each node maintains a route to every 
other node in the network. To diffuse topology information, nodes periodically exchange 
topology control (YC) messages with their neighbours. The TC message for a given node 
lists the set of neighbours that have selected the sending node as an MPR. This is called 
the multi point relay selector set of the node. Only this set of nodes is advertised within 
the network. As a node receives TC messages from other network nodes, it can create or 
  
 S 
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modify routing entries to each node in the network using any shortest path routing 
algorithm, such as a variation of Dijkstra’s algorithm. 
 
2.3.2 Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing 
 
The Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [13] is based on the 
DSDV algorithm described in [7]. AODV is an improvement on DSDV because it 
typically minimizes the number of required broadcasts by creating routes on a demand 
basis, as opposed to maintaining a complete list of routes as in the DSDV algorithm. The 
authors of AODV classify it as a pure on-demand route acquisition system, since nodes 
that are not on a selected path do not maintain routing information or participate in 
routing table exchanges. 
 
When a source node desires to send a message to some destination node and does not 
already have a valid route to that destination, it initiates a path discovery process to locate 
the other node. It broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors, which then 
forward the request to their neighbors, and so on, until either the destination or an 
intermediate node with a “fresh enough” route to the destination is located. Figure 2.4a 
illustrates the propagation of the broadcast RREQs across the network. AODV utilizes 
destination sequence numbers to ensure all routes are loop-free and contain the most 
recent route information. Each node maintains its own sequence number, as well as a 
broadcast ID. The broadcast ID is incremented for every RREQ the node initiates, and 
together with the node’s IP address, uniquely identifies an RREQ. Along with its own 
sequence number and the broadcast ID, the source node includes in the RREQ the most 
recent sequence number it has for the destination. Intermediate nodes can reply to the 
RREQ only if they have a route to the destination whose corresponding destination 
sequence number is greater than or equal to that contained in the RREQ. 
 
During the process of forwarding the RREQ packets, intermediate nodes record in their 
route tables the address of the neighbor from which the first copy of the broadcast packet 
is received, thereby establishing a reverse path. If additional copies of the same RREQ 
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are later received, these packets are discarded. Once the RREQ reaches the destination or 
an intermediate node with a fresh enough route, the destination or the intermediate node 
responds by unicasting a route reply (RREP) packet back to the neighbor from which it 
first received the RREQ (Fig. 2.4b). As the RREP packet is routed back along the reverse 
path, nodes along this path set up forward route entries in their route tables which point to 
the node from which the RREP packet came. These forward route entries indicate the 
active forward route. Associated with each route entry is a route timer which will cause 
the deletion of the entry if it is not used within the specified lifetime. Because the RREP 
packet is forwarded along the path established by the RREQ packet, AODV only 
supports the use of symmetric links in the network. 
 
  
 
 
Fig 2.4: AODV route discovery 
 
Routes are maintained by AODV as follows. If a source node moves, it is able to 
reinitiate the route discovery protocol to find a new route to the destination. If a node 
along the route moves, its upstream neighbor notices the move and propagates a link 
failure notification message (an RREP packet with infinite metric) to each of its active 
upstream neighbors to inform them of the erasure of that part of the route [13]. These 
nodes in turn propagate the link failure notification to their upstream neighbors, and so on 
until the source node is reached. The source node may then choose to reinitiate route 
discovery for that destination if a route is still desired. 
(a) Propagation of the RREQ (b) Path of the RREP to the source
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An additional aspect of the protocol is the use of hello messages, periodic local 
broadcasts by a node to inform each mobile node of other nodes in its neighborhood. 
Hello messages can be used to maintain the local connectivity of a node. Nodes listen for 
retransmission of data packets to ensure that the next hop is still within reach. If such a 
retransmission is not heard, the node may use any one of a number of techniques, 
including the reception of hello messages, to determine whether the next hop is within 
communication range. The hello messages may list the other nodes from which a mobile 
has heard, thereby yielding greater knowledge of network connectivity. 
 
2.3.3 Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
 
As explained earlier, either a purely proactive or purely reactive approach to implement a 
routing protocol for a MANET has their disadvantages. The Zone Routing Protocol 
(ZRP) as described in [16] aims at addressing these limitations by combining the best 
properties of both proactive and reactive approaches and hence it can be classed as a 
hybrid proactive/reactive routing protocol. 
 
In a MANET it can be safely assumed that most communication takes palace between 
nodes close to each other. Therefore, ZRP reduces the proactive scope to a zone centered 
on each node and reactive approach outside the zone. When a node has a data packet for a 
particular destination, it checks whether the destination is within its zone or not. If it is 
within the zone, the packet is routed proactively. Reactive routing is used if the 
destination is outside the zone.  
 
A zone (routing zone) of a node is nothing but the area of local neighbourhood of that 
node. The “size” of a zone is not determined by geographical measurement, as one might 
expect, but is given by a radius of length β where, β is the number of hops to the 
perimeter of the zone. Each node may be within multiple overlapping zones, and each 
zone may be of a different size. An example routing zone is shown in Figure 2.5, where 
the routing zone of S includes the nodes A–I, but not K. In the illustrations, the radius is 
marked as a circle around the node in question.  
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Fig 2.5: Routing zone of node S with zone radius β =2 
 
The nodes of a zone are divided into peripheral nodes and interior nodes. Peripheral 
nodes are nodes whose minimum distance to the central node is exactly equal to the zone 
radius β. The nodes whose minimum distance is less than β are interior nodes. In Figure 
2.5, the nodes A–F are interior nodes, the nodes G–J are peripheral nodes and the node K 
is outside the routing zone. Note that node H can be reached by two paths, one with 
length 2 and one with length 3 hops. The node is however within the zone, since the 
shortest path is less than or equal to the zone radius. 
 
ZRP refers to the locally proactive routing component as the IntrA-zone Routing Protocol 
(IARP) [18]. The globally reactive routing component is named IntEr-zone Routing 
Protocol (IERP) [19]. IERP and IARP are not specific routing protocols. Instead, IARP is 
a family of limited-depth, proactive link-state routing protocols like OLSR (Refer Section 
2.3.1). It periodically computes the route to all intrazone nodes (nodes that are within the 
routing zone of a node) and maintains this information in a data structure called IARP 
routing table. Correspondingly, IERP is a family of reactive routing protocols like DSR 
[12] or AODV (Refer Section 2.3.2) that offer enhanced route discovery and route 
maintenance services based on local connectivity monitored by IARP.  
 
Since IARP employees a proactive link state routing protocol for maintaining intrazone 
routing information, the first thing which becomes necessary for IARP is to know about 
the neighbours of a node. In order to learn about a node’s direct neighbors and possible 
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IARP :  IntrA-zone Routing Protocol    
IERP :  IntEr-zone Routing Protocol 
BRP :  Boarder Resolution Protocol      
NDP :  Neighborhood Discovery Protocol 
 
A         B:  Information passed from protocol A to B 
A         B:  Exchange of packets between protocol A  
   and B 
 
link failures, IARP relies on a Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) provided by the MAC 
layer. NDP transmits “HELLO” beacons at regular intervals. Upon receiving a beacon, 
the neighbor table [18] is updated. Neighbors, for which no beacon has been received 
within a specified time, are removed from the table 
 
For route discovery by IERP, the notion bordercasting [20] is introduced. Bordercasting 
utilizes the topology information provided by IARP to direct query request to the border 
of the zone. The bordercast packet delivery service is provided by the Bordercast 
Resolution Protocol (BRP) [20]. BRP uses a map of an extended routing zone to 
construct bordercast trees for the query packets. BRP employs query control mechanisms, 
to direct route requests away from areas of the network that already have been covered. 
[20]. The relationship between the components is illustrated in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.6: ZRP Architecture 
 
Routing: A node that has a packet to send first checks whether the destination is within 
its local zone or not using information provided by IARP routing table. If the destination 
is within the zone, then the IARP routing table must have a valid route to the destination. 
So in this case, the packet is routed proactively to the intrazone destination. Reactive 
routing is used if the destination is outside the zone. 
NETWORK LAYER
IERP
BRP
IARP
ZRP
MAC LAYERNDP
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The reactive routing process is divided into two phases: the route request phase and the 
route reply phase. In the route request, the source sends a route request packet to its 
peripheral nodes using BRP. If the receiver of a route request packet knows the 
destination, it responds by sending a route reply back to the source. Otherwise, it 
continues the process by bordercasting the packet. In this way, the route request spreads 
throughout the network. If a node receives several copies of the same route request, these 
are considered as redundant and are discarded [19, 20]. 
 
The reply is sent by any node that can provide a route to the destination. To be able to 
send the reply back to the source node, routing information must be accumulated when 
the request is sent through the network. The information is recorded either in the route 
request packet (source routing approach [12]), or as next-hop addresses in the nodes 
along the path similar to AODV. In the first case, the nodes forwarding a route request 
packet append their address and relevant node/link metrics to the packet. When the 
packet reaches the destination, the sequence of addresses is reversed and copied to the 
route reply packet. The sequence is used to forward the reply back to the source. In the 
second case, the forwarding nodes records routing information as next-hop addresses, 
which are used when the reply is sent to the source. This approach can save transmission 
resources, as the request and reply packets are smaller [19]. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we presented mobile ad hoc networks as a new paradigm for wireless 
communication. We identified the characteristics, complexities and design constraints 
associated with them, discussed some of their deployment scenarios and classify the 
existing routing algorithms in it. In the next chapter, we look into ad hoc networking 
from security view point. We identify the different kinds of security attacks an ad hoc 
network faces and explore new approaches to secure its communication.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
 
 
Wireless mobile ad hoc nature of MANET brings new security challenges to network 
design. Mobile adhoc networks, due to their unique characteristics, are generally more 
vulnerable to information and physical security threats than wired networks or 
infrastructure-based wireless networks. In this chapter, we explore the various security 
requirements (goals) for wireless ad hoc network and the different types of threats an ad 
hoc network faces. We identify the new challenges and opportunities posed by this new 
networking environment and explore new approaches to secure its communication.  
 
3.1 Security Goals 
 
To secure an ad hoc network, a security protocol must satisfy the following attributes:  
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-repudiation [22, 23]. 
 
Confidentiality ensures that classified information in the network is never disclosed to 
unauthorized entities. Sensitive information, such as strategic military decisions or 
location information requires confidentiality. Leakage of such information to enemies 
could have devastating consequences.  
 
Integrity guarantees that a message being transferred between nodes is never altered or 
corrupted. Data can be altered either intentionally by malicious nodes in the network or 
accidentally because of benign failures, such as radio propagation impairment or through 
hardware glitches in the network.  
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Availability implies that the requested services (e.g. bandwidth and connectivity) are 
available in a timely manner even though there is a potential problem in the system. 
Availability of a network can be tempered for example by dropping off packets and by 
resource depletion attacks. 
 
Authenticity is a network service to determine a user’s identity. Without authentication, 
an attacker can impersonate any node, and in this way, one by one node, it can gain 
control over the entire network. 
 
Finally, non-repudiation ensures that the information originator cannot deny having sent 
the message. Non-repudiation is useful for detection and isolation of compromised nodes.  
 
3.2 Issues and Challenges in Security Provisioning 
 
Designing a foolproof security protocol for ad hoc routing is a very challenging task due 
its unique characteristics such as, shared radio channel, insecure operational environment, 
lack of central authority and association rules among nodes and limited availability of 
resources [1]. A brief discussion on how each of the above mentioned characteristics 
causes difficulty in providing security in ad hoc wireless network is given below. 
 
 Shared radio channel: Unlike the wired networks where a separate dedicated 
transmission line can be provided between a pair of end users, the radio channel 
used for communication in ad hoc networks is broadcast in nature and shared by 
all nodes in the network. Data transmitted by a node is received by all the nodes 
within its direct transmission range. So a malicious node can easily obtain data 
being transmitted in the network. 
 
 Insecure operational environment: The operational environment in which 
MANETs are generally used may not be always secure, for example, a battle 
field. In such environment, nodes may move in and out of hostile and insecure 
enemy territory, where they would be highly vulnerable to security attacks. 
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 Lack of central authority: In wired networks or infrastructure based wireless 
networks it would be possible to monitor the network traffic through routers or 
base stations and implement security mechanisms at those points. Since MANETs 
don’t have any such central points, these mechanisms can’t be applicable to them. 
 
 Lack of association rules: In MANET, since nodes can leave or join the network 
at any point of time, if no proper authentication mechanism is used for associating 
nodes with the network intruders can easily join the network and carry out attacks.  
 
 Limited availability of resources: Resources such as bandwidth, battery power 
and computational power are scare in ad hoc networks. Hence, it is difficult to 
implement complex cryptography-based security mechanisms in such networks. 
 
3.3 Security Attacks on Ad Hoc Routing Protocols 
 
The complexity and uniqueness of MANETs make them more vulnerable to security 
threats than their wired counterparts. Attacks on ad hoc wireless networks can be 
classified as passive and active attacks, depending on whether the normal operation of the 
network is disrupted or not. [2].  
 
 Passive attacks: A passive attack does not disrupt the normal operation of the 
network; the attacker snoops the data exchanged in the network without altering 
it. Here the requirement of confidentiality gets violated. Detection of passive 
attack is very difficult since the operation of the network itself doesn’t get 
affected. One of the solutions to the problem is to use powerful encryption 
mechanism to encrypt the data being transmitted, there by making it impossible 
for the attacker to get useful information from the data overheard. 
 
 Active attacks: An active attack attempts to alter or destroy the data being 
exchanged in the network there by disrupting the normal functioning of the 
network. Active attacks can be internal or external. External attacks are carried 
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out by nodes that do not belong to the network. Internal attacks are from 
compromised nodes that are part of the network. Since the attacker is already part 
of the network, internal attacks are more severe and hard to detect than external 
attacks. Active attacks, whether carried out by an external advisory or an internal 
compromised node involves actions such as impersonation (masquerading or 
spoofing), modification, fabrication and replication.  
 
Both passive and active attacks can be made on any layer of the network protocol stack 
[1]. This section however, focuses on network layer attacks only (routing attacks). 
Depending upon the various attacking behavior routing attacks can be classified into five 
categories: attacks using information disclosure, impersonation (masquerading or 
spoofing), modification, fabrication, and replay of packets. Among these information 
disclosure is a passive attack while the rest fall under the active category. 
 
3.3.1 Information disclosure Attack 
 
In this, a compromised node may leak confidential information to unauthorized nodes in 
the network. Such information may include information regarding the network topology, 
geographic location of nodes or, optimal routes to unauthorized nodes in the network [2]. 
Attacks such as location disclosure and traffic analysis come under this category. 
 
3.3.2 Attacks using Impersonation 
 
In impersonation attacks, the attacker assumes the identity and privileges of an authorized 
node, either to make use of the network resources that may not be available to it under 
normal circumstances, or to disrupt the normal functioning of the network by injecting 
false routing information into the network. Impersonation can be done by several ways. 
The attacker could by chance guess the identity and authentication details of the authentic 
node called the target node, or it could snoop for the authentication details of the target 
node from the previous communication. Some of the impersonation attacks include:  
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Man-in-the-Middle Attack: In this attack, a malicious node impersonates the receiver 
with respect to the sender, and the sender with respect to the receiver, without having 
either of them realize that they have been attacked with an intension to read or modify the 
messages between two parties [23]. 
 
Sybil Attack: In the Sybil attack [25], an attacker pretends to have multiple identities. A 
malicious node can behaves as if it were a larger number of nodes either by 
impersonating other nodes or simply by claiming false identities. Sybil attacks are 
classified into three categories: direct/indirect communication, fabricated/stolen identity, 
and simultaneity. In the direct communication, Sybil nodes communicate directly with 
legitimate nodes, whereas in the indirect communication messages sent to Sybil nodes are 
routed through malicious nodes. An attacker can fabricate a new identity or it can simply 
steal it after destroying or temporarily disabling the impersonated node. All Sybil 
identities can participate simultaneously in the network or they may be cycled through. 
 
3.3.3 Attacks using Modification 
 
This attack disrupts the routing function by having the attacker illegally modifying the 
content of the messages. Examples of such attacks include redirection by changing the 
route sequence number and redirection with modified hop count. Some of the attacks 
involving packet modification are given below: 
 
Misrouting Attack: In the misrouting attack, a non-legitimate node redirects the routing 
message and sends data packet to the wrong destination [33]. This type of attack is 
carried out by modifying the final destination address of the data packet or by forwarding 
a data packet to the wrong next hop in the route to the destination.  
 
Byzantine attack: Here a compromised intermediate node or a set of compromised 
intermediate nodes collectively carries out attacks such as creating routing loops, routing 
packets on non-optimal paths and selectively dropping packets [26]. Since in such attacks 
the network would seem to operate normally Byzantine failure are hard to detect. 
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Denial of service (DoS) attack: In this type of attack, an attacker attempts to prevent 
legitimate and authorized users of services offered by the network from accessing those 
services.  A DoS attack can be carried out in many ways and against any layer in the 
network protocol stack. The classic way is to flood packets to any centralized resource 
used in the network by modifying the routes information in the packets so that the 
resource is no longer available to nodes in the network, resulting the network no longer 
operating in the manner it was designed to operate. This may lead to failure in the 
delivery of guaranteed services to the end users. 
 
3.3.4 Attacks using Fabrication 
 
In fabrication attacks, an intruder generates false routing messages, such as routing 
updates and route error messages, in order to disturb network operation or to consume 
other node resources. A number of fabrication based attacks are presented below: 
 
Resource Consumption Attack: In this attack, a malicious node deliberately tries to 
consume the resources (e.g. battery power, bandwidth, etc.) of other nodes in the network 
[4]. The attacks could be in the form of unnecessary route request control messages, very 
frequent generation of beacon packets, or forwarding of stale information to nodes.  
 
Routing Table or Route Cache Poisoning: In this attack, a malicious node sends false 
routing updates to other uncompromised nodes [1]. Such an attack may result in sub-
optimal routing, network congestion or even make some part of the network inaccessible.  
 
Routing table overflow: Here, the attacker advertises routes to non-existing nodes, to the 
authorized nodes present in the network. The main objective of such an attack is to cause 
an overflow of the routing table, which would in turn prevent the creation of entries 
corresponding to new routes to authorized nodes [1]. Proactive routing protocols are 
more vulnerable to this attack compared to reactive routing protocols. 
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Rushing Attack: On demand routing protocols that use route discovery process are 
vulnerable to this type of attack [27]. An attacker node which receives a “route request” 
packet from the source node floods the packet quickly through out the network before 
other nodes which also receive the same “route request” packet can react. Nodes that 
receive the legitimate “route request” packet assume those packets to be the duplicates of 
the packet already received through the attacker node and hence discard those packets. 
Any route discovered by the source node would contain the attacker node as one of the 
intermediate nodes. Hence the source node would not be able to find secure routes. 
 
Black Hole Attack: In this type of attack, a malicious node falsely advertises good path 
(e.g., shortest path or most stable path) to the destination node during the path finding 
process [1]. The intension of the malicious nodes could be to hinder the path finding 
process or to interrupt all the data packets being sent to the concerned destination node. 
 
Gray Hole Attack: Under this attack, an attacker drops all data packets but it lets control 
messages to route through it [28]. This selective dropping makes gray hole attacks much 
more difficult to detect then blackhole attack.  
 
3.3.5 Replay Attacks 
 
In the replay attack, an attacker retransmits data to produce an unauthorized effect. 
Examples of replay attacks are wormhole attack and tunneling attack. 
 
Wormhole Attack: In this attack [29], two compromised nodes can communicate with 
each other by a private network connection. The attacker can create a vertex cut of nodes 
in the network by recording a packet at one location in network, tunneling the packet to 
another location, and replaying it there. The attacker does not require key material as it 
only needs two transceivers and one high quality out-of-band channel. The wormhole can 
drop packets or it can selectively forward packets to avoid detection. It is particularly 
dangerous against different network routing protocols in which the nodes consider 
themselves neighbor after hearing a packet transmission directly from some node. 
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Tunneling Attack: In a tunneling attack [33], two or more nodes collaborate and 
exchange encapsulated messages along existing data routes. For example, if a Route 
Request packet is encapsulated and sent between two attackers, the packet will not 
contain the path traveled between the two attackers. This would falsely make the receiver 
conclude that the path containing the attackers is the shortest path available. 
 
3.4 Security Mechanisms and Solutions 
 
Having seen the various kinds of attacks possible on ad hoc routing, we now look at 
various techniques employed to overcome these attacks. There can be two types of 
security mechanisms: preventive and detective. Preventive mechanisms are typically 
based on message encryption techniques, while detective mechanisms include the 
application of digital signature and cryptographic hash functions [2]. 
 
3.4.1 Message Encryption 
 
Encipherment or message encryption is the science and art of transforming a message 
into a disguised version which no unauthorized person can read, but which can be 
recovered in its original form by an intended recipient. In the parlance of cryptography, 
the original message is called plaintext and the secret version of the message is called 
ciphertext. The plaintext is converted into ciphertext by the process of encryption, that is, 
by the use of certain algorithms or functions. The reverse process is called decryption. 
The process of encryption and decryption are governed by keys, which are small amount 
of information used by the cryptographic algorithms. 
 
There are two types of encryption techniques: symmetric key and asymmetric key (or 
public key). Symmetric key cryptosystem uses the same key (the secret key) for 
encryption and decryption of a message, where as asymmetric key cryptosystems use one 
key (the public key) to encrypt a message and another key (the private key) to decrypt it. 
Public and private keys are related in such a way that only the public key can be used to 
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encrypt messages and only the corresponding private key can be used for decryption 
purpose. Even if attacker comprises a public key, it is virtually impossible to deduce the 
private key. Symmetric key algorithms are usually faster to execute electronically than 
the asymmetric key algorithms.  
 
3.4.2 Digital signature and Hashing 
 
The process of encryption only ensures the confidentiality of the message being sent. 
Digital signature is a technique by which one can achieve the other security goals like 
message integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. In this the sender uses a signing 
algorithm and its private key to sign the message. The message and the signature are sent 
to the receiver. The receiver receives the message and the signature and applies the 
verifying algorithm on the message-signature pair. The verification algorithm requires a 
verification key, which is a public key provided by the signer, to verify the document. 
After verification if the result is true, the message is accepted; otherwise, it is rejected. 
 
Hashing can be used for the digital signature process especially when the message is 
long. In this the message is passed through an algorithm called cryptographic hash 
function or one-way hash function before signing. It is an algorithm which creates a 
compressed image of the message in the form of a hash value (or message digest) which 
is usually much smaller than the message and unique to it. Any change to the message 
will produce a different hash result even when the same hash function is used.  
 
3.4.3 Key Management Approaches 
 
Both digital signature and encryption mechanisms are key-based approaches. Key 
distribution and management is therefore at the center of these mechanisms. There are 
several methods given in [1] that can be employed to perform this operation, all requiring 
varying amounts of initial configuration, communication and computation. We will 
however, focus on the method based on public key certificates [30], as we have used this 
approach in our proposed protocol. 
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According to this approach, the key management responsibility is shared among a set of 
trusted certification servers called the certification authorities (CAs). Each CA has a 
public/private key pair, with its public key known to every node, and signs certificates 
binding public keys to nodes after verifying their authenticity secretly. The trusted CA 
has to stay on-line to reflect the current bindings, because the bindings could change over 
time: a public key should be revoked if the owner node is no longer trusted or is out of 
the network; a node may refresh its key pair periodically to reduce the chance of a 
successful brute-force attack on its private key. 
 
3.5 Secure routing 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, secure routing is highly desirable in ad hoc environment. The 
previous section pointed out some of the solutions proposed for ensuring security in 
mobile ad hoc networks. Current research has resulted in a number of secure routing 
protocols based on these security mechanisms. A survey of the protocols is given in [2, 
22, 23] whose details can be found in [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38].  In this section we explore 
the requirements of a secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks and discuss a secure 
routing protocol called “Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN)”, as we 
have employed similar security setting as that of ARAN in our proposed protocol. 
 
3.5.1 Requirements for a Secure Routing Protocol  
 
Considering the attacks presented in Section 3.3, we list here the fundamental requisites 
of a secure routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks. They are: (1) Routing messages 
cannot be altered in transit, except according to the normal functionality; (2) Route 
signaling cannot be spoofed; (3) Fabricated routing messages cannot be injected into the 
network; (4) Routing loops cannot be formed through malicious action; (5) Routes cannot 
be redirected from the shortest path by malicious action; (6) Unauthorized nodes should 
be excluded from route computation and discovery; (7) The network topology must not 
be exposed by the routing messages either to adversaries or to authorized nodes. 
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3.5.2 Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN) 
 
Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN) [33] is an on-demand protocol 
designed to provide secure communications in managed open environments. Nodes in a 
managed-open environment exchange initialization parameters before the start of 
communication. Session keys are exchanged or distributed through a trusted third party 
like a certification authority. Each node in ARAN receives a certificate after securely 
authenticating its identity to a trusted certificate server T. Nodes use these certificates to 
authenticate themselves to other nodes during the exchange of routing messages. The 
certificate contains the node’s IP address, its public key, as well as the time of issuing and 
expiration. These fields are concatenated and signed by the server T. A node A receives a 
certificate as: T → A: certA = [IPA, KA+, t, e] KT− 
 
In the authentication phase, ARAN ensures the existence of a secure path to the 
destination. Each intermediate node in the network stores the route pair (previous node, 
the destination node). All the fields are concatenated and signed with source node I’s 
private key. A combination of the nonce number (NI) and timestamp (t) is used to obtain 
data freshness and timeliness property. Each time I performs a route discovery, it 
monotonically increases the nonce. The signature prevents spoofing attacks that may alter 
the route or form loops. Source node I broadcasts a route discovery packet (RDP) for a 
destination D as: I → brdcst: [RDP, IPD, certI, NI, t] KI−. 
 
Each node that receives the RDP for the first time removes any other intermediate node’s 
signature, signs the RDP using its own key, and broadcasts it to all its neighboring nodes. 
This continues until destination node D eventually receives the packet. After receiving 
the RDP, the destination node D sends a reply (REP) packet back along the reverse path 
to the source node I. If J is the first node on the reverse path, REP packet is sent as:  
D → J: [REP, IPI, certD, NI, t] KD− 
 
The source node I on receiving the REP packet, verifies the destination’s signature KD− 
and the nonce NI. When there is no traffic on an existing route for some specific time, 
 33
then that route is deactivated in the routing table. Nodes use an ERR message to report 
links in active routes broken due to node movement.  
 
Using pre-determined cryptographic certificates, ARAN provides network services like 
authentication and non-repudiation. Simulations show that ARAN is efficient in 
discovering and maintaining routes but routing packets are larger in size and overall 
routing load is high. Due to heavy asymmetric cryptographic computation, ARAN has 
higher cost for route discovery. It is not immune to wormhole attack and if nodes do not 
have time synchronization, then it is prone to replay attacks as well. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
As research on developing a secure communication system for mobile ad hoc networks 
had matured, a number of secure routing protocols were proposed [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. 
In this chapter, we have described one of these protocols, ARAN. Like ARAN, most of 
the secure protocols are either proactive or reactive in nature. Studies reveal that, either a 
purely proactive or a purely reactive protocol performs well in a limited region of 
network setting. However, in diverse applications of ad hoc networks, the performance of 
either class of protocols degrades dramatically. For example, the reactive routing 
protocols are well suited for networks where the call-to-mobility ratio is relatively low, 
but as they have long route request delay, they are not ideal for an environment where 
this ratio is relatively high. Proactive routing protocols, on the other hand, are favorable 
for networks having high node mobility, however in a reverse environment they perform 
inefficiently, as, they use excess bandwidth in maintaining the routing information. 
 
Researchers advocate that the issue of efficient operation over a wide range of conditions 
can be addressed by a hybrid routing approach, where the proactive and the reactive 
behavior is mixed in the amounts that best match these operational conditions. In the next 
chapter we proposed such a hybrid secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks that will 
address the limitations of both proactive and reactive routing approaches. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) 
 
 
Neither a pure proactive nor a pure reactive approach provides a complete solution for 
secure ad hoc routing that performs efficiency across a wide range of operational 
conditions and network configuration. So a complete, efficient and applicable solution for 
secure routing is highly desirable that can operate well on diverse applications of ad hoc 
networks. This chapter presents the proposed solution, called the Secure Zone Routing 
Protocol (SZRP), which aims towards addressing this issue. We have detailed the design 
of the proposed protocol and analyzed its robustness in diverse networking environment, 
in the presence of multiple possible security attacks.  
 
4.1  Protocol Overview 
 
The Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) is based on the concept of Zone Routing 
Protocol (ZRP) [16, 17]. It is a hybrid routing protocol that combines the best features of 
both proactive and reactive approaches and adds its own security mechanisms to perform 
secure routing. The reasons for selecting ZRP as the basis of our protocol are as follows: 
(i) ZRP is based on the concept of routing zones, a restricted area, and it is more feasible 
to apply the security mechanisms within a restricted area than in a broader area that of the 
whole network, (ii) Since the concept of zones separate the communicating nodes in 
terms of interior (nodes within the zone) and exterior (nodes outside the zone) nodes, 
certain information like network topology and neighbourhood information etc. can be 
hidden to the exterior nodes, (iii) Incase of a failure, it can be restricted to a zone. 
 36
Like ZRP the proposed protocol performs routing in terms of intrazone [18] and 
interzone [19] routing. It limits the proactive scope within a zone centered on each node 
and the reactive approach outside the zone. However, it differs from ZRP in security 
aspects. In ZRP where there is no security consideration, SZRP is designed to address all 
measure security concerns like end to end authentication, message/packet integrity and 
data confidentiality during both intra and inter-zone routing. For end to end 
authentication and message/packet integrity RSA digital signature mechanism [24] is 
employed, where as data confidentiality is ensured by an integrated approach of both 
symmetric and asymmetric key encryption [24].  
 
Packets are signed and/or encrypted (either using symmetric or asymmetric key 
approach) depending upon their type i.e. whether the packet is a control or a data packet. 
Most of the control packets are only signed. However, all the data packets and those 
control packets that contain any secret information like a session key between the source 
and destination node and are signed as well as encrypted.  Since the control packets are 
small in size they are encrypted using the asymmetric key approach. As the data packets 
are generally long and symmetric key approach is faster than the asymmetric key 
encryption we encrypt all the data packets using the symmetric key approach.  
 
Each communicating node has two pairs of private/public keys, one pair for signing and 
verifying and the other for encrypting and decrypting. For a node X the signing and 
verifying keys are SKX and VKX respectively while, encrypting and decrypting keys are 
EKX and DKX respectively. Among these keys SKX and DKX are private keys whereas VKX 
and EKX are public keys. Notations used in our proposed protocol are given in Table 4.1. 
 
The secure zone routing protocol (SZRP) makes the use of public key certificates [30] for 
key distribution and management. Such certificates are already deployed as part of one-
hop 802.11 networks [1]; this is the case on the UMass campus, where an 802.11 VPN is 
deployed and certificates are carried by nodes. For the process of public key certification, 
SZRP assumes the presence of trusted certification servers called the certification 
authorities (CAs) in the network in addition to the communicating nodes which we call 
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the common nodes (CNs). Each CN before taking part in communication need to be 
certified by some CA and are granted public keys. The detail of the certification process 
is described in Section 4.2. 
 
SZRP is a two phase protocol. The first phase is the preliminary certification process 
where each CN fetches their required keys from their nearest CA. The second phase is 
secure routing phase which uses these keys to perform secure intra-zone or inter-zone 
routing by applying the process of digital signature and message encryption.  
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{d}EKX 
 
[d] | b 
 
certX 
 
IPX 
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NX 
 
SKREQ 
 
SKREP 
 
SRD 
 
SRR 
 
ERR 
 
Signature Key of node X (A private key used by X for signing) 
 
Signature verification key for node X. (A public key provided by X to verify its 
signature done with SKX) 
 
Encryption Key for node X (A public key supplied by node X for encrypting any 
message to be sent to X) 
 
Decryption Key of node X (A private key used by X for decrypting any message 
which is encrypted with EKX ) 
 
Packet ‘d’ signed with SKX, this can be only verified using VKX  
 
Message ‘d’ encrypted with EKX, this can be only decrypted with DKX 
 
b is appended to the packet containing d 
 
Public key certificate of X. 
 
IP address of X 
 
Time stamp 
 
Certificate expiration time 
 
Nonce issued by node X 
 
Session Key Request packet identifier 
 
Session Key Reply packet identifier 
 
Secure Route Discovery packet identifier 
 
Secure Route Reply packet identifier 
 
Error packet identifier 
 
 
 Table 4.1: Notations Used in the Proposed Protocol 
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4.2 Certification Process 
 
The Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) requires the presence of trusted certification 
servers called the certification authorities (CAs) in the network. The CAs are assumed to 
be safe, whose public keys are known to all valid CNs. Keys are generated apriori and 
exchanged through an existing, perhaps out of band, relationship between CA and each 
CN. Before entering the ad hoc network, each node requests a certificate from it’s nearest 
CA. Each node receives exactly one certificate after securely authenticating their identity 
to the CA. The idea is depicted in Figure 4.1. The methods for secure authentication to 
the certificate server are numerous and hence it is left to the developers; a significant list 
is provided by [24, 30].  
 
 
 
Fig 4.1: Certification Process in SZRP 
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A common node X receives a certificate from its nearest CA as follows:  
 
CA→ X: certX = [IPX, VKX, EKX, t, e] | signCA 
where, signCA =    [IPX, VKX, EKX, t, e] SKCA 
 
The certificate contains the IP address of X, the two public keys VKX and EKX of X, one 
for verifying the signature signed by X and other for encrypting a packet to be send to X, 
a timestamp ‘t’ of when the certificate was created, and a time ‘e’ at which the certificate 
expires, all appended by the signature signCA of CA. All nodes must maintain fresh 
certificates with their nearest CA. 
 
4.3 Design of Secure Zone Routing Protocol 
 
This section describes in details the architectural design of the proposed protocol as a 
whole and its individual components in particular.  
 
4.3.1 Design Assumptions 
 
We have assumed the following things for the design and successful deployment of the 
proposed protocol.  
 
 The network links are assumed to be bidirectional.  
 
 The resources of different ad hoc network nodes may vary greatly, from nodes 
with very little computational resources, to resource rich nodes equivalent in 
functionality to high-performance workstations. To make our results as general as 
possible, we have designed SZRP to support nodes with moderate resources, such 
as a Palm Pilot or RIM pager.  
 
 The proposed protocol intends to provide security at IP layer. Hence, for a secure 
communication across the network protocol stack suitable techniques should be 
employed to secure MAC and physical layers. A list of such mechanisms is given 
in [4, 31, 32].  
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KMP :  Key Management Protocol  
SIARP :  Secure IntrA-zone Routing Protocol    
SIERP :  Secure IntEr-zone Routing Protocol 
MBRP :  Modified Boarder Resolution Protocol      
NDP :  Neighborhood Discovery Protocol 
 
A         B:  Information passed from protocol A to B 
A         B:  Exchange of packets between protocol A  
   and B 
 
4.3.2 Architecture 
 
The architectural design of SZRP is shown in Figure: 4.2. The proposed architecture is a 
modification of ZRP [16]. It is designed to support both secure routing (intrazone and 
interzone) and effective key management. There are dedicated and independent 
components in SZRP to carry out these tasks. The functionality of each component and 
their interrelationship is explained below. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.2: Architecture of SZRP 
 
The key management protocol (KMP) is responsible for public key certification process 
discussed in section 4.2. It fetches the public keys for each CN by certifying them with 
the nearest CA. The secure intrazone routing protocol (SIARP) and secure interzone 
routing protocol (SIERP) uses these keys to perform secure intrazone and interzone 
routing respectively 
 
SIARP is a limited depth proactive link-state routing protocol [5, 6] with inbuilt security 
features. It periodically computes the route to all intrazone nodes (nodes that are within 
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the routing zone of a node) and maintains this information in a data structure called 
SIARP routing table. This process is called proactive route computation. The route 
information to all intrazone nodes collected in proactive route computation phase is used 
by SIARP to perform secure intrazone routing. A detail discussion on secure intrazone 
routing and proactive route computation is given in Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.5 
respectively. 
 
SIERP is a family of reactive routing protocols [5] with added security features like 
ARAN [33]. It offers on demand secure route discovery and route maintenance services 
based on local connectivity information monitored by SIARP. The interzone routing and 
the route maintenance services offered by SIERP are discussed in Section 4.4.2 and 
Section 4.6 respectively  
 
In order to detect the neighbor nodes and possible link failures, SZRP relies on the 
neighborhood discovery protocol (NDP) [18] similar to that of ZRP. NDP does this by 
periodically transmitting a HELLO beckon (a small packet) to the neighbors at each node 
and updating the neighbor table [18] on receiving similar HELLO beckons from the 
neighbors. NDP gives the information about the neighbors to SIARP and also notifies 
SIARP when the neighbor table updates. We have assumed that NDP is implemented as a 
MAC layer protocol. A number of security mechanisms suggested in [4, 32, 33] for MAC 
layer can be employed to secure NDP.  
 
To minimize the delay during interzone route discovery, SIERP uses bordercasting 
technique [20] similar to ZRP, which is implemented here by the modified border 
resolution protocol (MBRP). MBRP is a modification of the bordercast technique [20] 
adopted in ZRP. It not only forwards SIERP’s secure route discovery packets to the 
peripheral nodes of the bordercasting node but also sets up a reverse path back to the 
neighbour by recording its IP address. MBRP uses the routing table of SIARP to guide 
these route queries. Since, all security measures are taken by SIERP during interzone 
routing; no additional security mechanism is adopted by MBRP during bordercasting. 
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4.4 The Secure Routing Algorithm 
 
This section describes the secure intrazone and interzone routing in details. We consider 
the network in Figure 4.3 for the illustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.3: Intrazone and Interzone destinations of node A (zone radius β = 2) 
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zone, for example if node A has a packet destined for node Y, the packet is forwarded to 
the destination proactively using SIARP. On the other hand if the destination is outside 
the zone, for example if node A wants to transmit a packet to Z, then interzone routing is 
performed using SIERP 
 
4.4.1 Secure Intra-Zone routing 
 
For intrazone routing we consider A as the source and Y as the destination. The following 
steps are taken by SIARP (at node A) to route a data packet from A to Y. 
 
Step 1:  A looks for the route to Y in its SIARP routing table and finds it to be A-F-Y.  
 
Step 2:  A sends a SKREQ packet to Y along this route requesting a session key KAY 
between A and Y.  
 
A→ Y : [SKREQ, IPY, certA] | signA 
where, signA = [SKREQ, IPY, certA] SKA 
 
The SKREQ packet contains a packet type identifier “SKREQ”, the IP address 
of the destination Y, and A’s certificate, all appended by the signature signA of A 
signed using SKA.  
 
Step 3: Y on receiving this request, verifies the signature using VKA, which it extracts 
from A’s certificate, creates the session key KAY, encrypts it using EKA and 
sends it to A as SKREP packet along the reverse route Y-F-A. 
 
Y→ A : [SKREP, IPA, certY, {KAY}EKA] | signY 
where, signY = [SKREP, IPA, certY,  {KAY}EKA] SKY 
 
The packet contains a packet type identifier “SKREP”, the IP address of A, the 
certificate of Y and the session key encrypted using EKA, all appended by the 
signature signY of Y signed using SKY.  
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Step 4: A on receiving the SKREP packet, verifies the packet using VKY, conforms its 
authenticity, decrypts it using DKA and extracts the session key KAY.  
 
Once A gets the session key KAY, it can encrypt the data packet using KAY and send it to Y 
along the same route A-F-Y. All further communication between A and Y takes place 
similarly, using this session key. 
 
4.4.2 Secure Inter-Zone routing 
 
Secure interzone routing is done using SIERP. The interzone routing is initiated with an 
on demand secure route discovery phase in which the source finds the route to the desired 
interzone destination. The source then sends the data packet along this route. In our case 
when A wants to send a packet to Z, A looks in its SIARP routing table for a valid route to 
Z. Since Z is not within the zone of A, A fails to find the route. In this case, A begins the 
secure route discovery process to Z. The secure route discovery process gives A the 
authentic route to Z after which A forwards the data packet to Z along this route. In 
addition to secure route discovery, SIERP also performs route maintenance services 
based on the local connectivity information monitored by SIARP. Route maintenance is 
discussed in Section 4.6.  
 
The following steps are taken by SIERP to route the data packet from A to Z:  
 
Step 1: SIERP at A begins the secure route discovery process to Z by bordercasting to 
its peripheral nodes T, E and Y, a SRD packet with the help of MBRP.  
 
A→ bordercast : [SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] | signA 
where, signA =  [SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] SKA 
 
The packet contains a packet type identifier “SRD”, the IP address of the 
destination Z,  A’s certificate, the zone radius ‘β’, a nonce NA created by A and 
the current time t, all appended by the signature signA of A. The nonce NA is 
monotonically increased every time A performs route discovery. NA and t 
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together with the IP address of A (IPA) uniquely identify the SRD which 
prevents the replay attack. NA is made large enough such that, it will not need 
to be recycled within the probable clock skew between receivers. If a nonce 
later reappears in a valid packet that has a later timestamp, the nonce is 
assumed to have wrapped around, and is therefore accepted. Note that a hop 
count is not included with the message.  
 
Step 2:  When a peripheral node of A (T, E or Y), receives the SRD, it checks the (IPA, 
NA, t) tuple to verify that it has not already processed this SRD. Nodes do 
process packets for which they have already seen this tuple. The receiving 
node uses A’s public key, which it extracts from A’s certificate, to validate the 
signature and verify that A’s certificate has not expired. If the packet is found 
to be authentic, it sets up a reverse path back to the source A by recording the 
neighbor from which it received the SRD, for example when the peripheral 
node T receives the SRD it sets up a reverse path back to A by recording the 
neighbor B from which it received the SRD (B sets up a reverse path to A 
during bordercasting. Now, T sets up the reverse path to B. So a reverse path 
from T to A is set).  
 
The peripheral node then signs the contents of the message originally 
bordercast by A and appends this signature and its own certificate to the SRD. 
It checks in its SIARP routing table whether it has a valid path to the 
destination Z. If it has (Z is within the zone of the node), it forwards the SRD 
directly to Z along this route, otherwise it rebordercasts the packet to its 
peripheral nodes. In the present case since none of the peripheral nodes T, E 
and Y has the route to Z (Z is not within the zone of T, E or Y), all 
rebordercasts the SRD to their peripheral nodes, for example, T rebordercasts 
the SRD to K. 
 
T→bordercast : [[SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] | signA ] | signT, certT  
where, signT =[[SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] | signA]]SKT 
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Step 3: Upon receiving the SRD, T’s peripheral node K checks the (IPA, NA, t) tuple, 
validates T’s signature and sets up the reverse path to T (if the signature is 
authentic). K then removes T’s certificate and signature, signs the contents of 
the message originally bordercast by A and appends this sign along with its 
own certificate to the SRD. It checks in its SIARP routing table whether it has 
a valid path to Z. Since it doesn’t, it again rebordercasts the packet to its 
peripheral nodes I and D. 
 
K→bordercast : [[SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] | signA ] | signK, certK 
where, signK =[[SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] | signA]]SKK 
 
Each node along the path repeats these steps of validating the previous node’s 
signature, recording the previous node’s IP address for setting up the reverse 
path, removing the previous node’s certificate and signature, signing the 
original contents of the message, appending its own certificate and 
rebordercasting the message, until the SRD reaches a node, that has a valid 
route to the destination Z (Z is within the zone of the node). In this case the 
node instead of rebordercasting the SRD, directly forwards it to Z. For 
example, when the SDR reaches J, it validates the packet, sets up the reverse 
path to the bordercasting node D, removes D’s certificate and signature, signs 
the contents of the message originally bordercast by A, appends this signature 
and its certificate and forwards the SRD to Z. 
  
J→Z : [[SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] | signA ] | signJ, certJ 
where, signH =[[SRD, IPZ, certA, β, NA, t] | signA]]SKJ 
 
Step 4: Finally, the SRD arrives at destination Z, which replies to the first SRD that it 
receives for a source and a given nonce. There is no guarantee that the first SRD 
received traveled along the shortest path from the source. A SRD that travels 
along the shortest path may be prevented from reaching the destination first if it 
encounters congestion or network delay, either legitimately or maliciously 
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manifested. In this case, however, a non-congested, non-shortest path is likely to 
be preferred to a congested shortest path because of the reduction in delay. 
Because SRDs do not contain a hop count or specific recorded source route, and 
because messages are signed at each hop, malicious nodes have no opportunity 
to redirect traffic.  
 
Z on getting this SRD packet verifies it using both VKJ and VKA, confirms its 
authenticity and extracts EKA. Z creates a secure route reply (SRR) packet and 
unicasts it back to the source along the reverse path. The first node that receives 
the SRR sent by Z is H. 
 
Z→H : [SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ  
where, signZ  = [SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA]SKZ 
 
The SRR includes a packet type identifier “SRR”, the IP address of A, the 
certificate of Z, the nonce NA, the associated time stamp t sent by A and a 
session key KAZ between A and Z encrypted with EKA, all appended by the 
signature signZ  of Z. Nodes that receive the SRR forward the packet back to the 
predecessor from which they received the original SRD. Each node along the 
reverse path back to the source signs the SRR and appends its own certificate 
before forwarding the SRR to the next hop. Since, J is the next hop node to the 
source A after H: 
 
H→J : [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] | signH, certH 
Where, signH = [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] SKH 
 
J on getting the SRR validates H’s signature on it, removes H’s signature and 
certificate, signs the contents of the message and appends this signature and its 
own certificate before unicasting the SRR to its neighbour L. 
 
.J→L : [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] | signJ, certJ 
Where, signJ = [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] SKJ 
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Each node checks the nonce and signature of the previous hop as the SRR is 
returned to the source. This avoids attacks involving impersonation and replay 
of the message. Eventually the source A receives the SRR. 
 
Step 5: On getting the SRR, A verifies Z’s signature and the nonce returned by Z to 
conform its authenticity. It then extracts the session key KAZ. A now encrypt the 
data packet using KAZ and send it to Z along the same route. 
 
4.5 Proactive route computation 
 
For proactive route computation each node within its routing zone periodically advertises 
a link state packet (LSP). For example, node A advertises the LSP within the zone of A. 
 
A→ brdcast :  [LSP, IPA, certA, β, TTL, SNo, neighbour[n], link_metric[n]] | signA  
Where, signA = [LSP, IPA, certA, β, TTL, SNo, neighbour[n], link_metric[n]] SKA   
 
The packet contains a packet type identifier “LSP”, the IP address of the broadcasting 
node A, the certificate of A, the zone radius ‘β’, a time-to-live (TTL) value, the sequence 
number SNo of the packet which is used to track the link state history of the source node 
A, the list of neighbours of A, and link metrics, all appended by the signature signA of A. 
The TTL field is used to control the scope of the packet which is initialized to β-1 hops 
by A. Upon receipt the packet, the TTL value is decremented and as long as the value is 
greater than 0, the LSP is rebroadcasted.  
 
When a neighbour of A, receives the LSP, it verifies the authenticity of the packet using 
VKA which it extract from A’s certificate in the LSP, add LSP’s information to its link-
state table [6], decrement the value of TTL field and again forwards this LSP as long as 
the value of TTL field is greater than 0 else the LSP is dropped. Because every node 
within the zone of A receives the same LSPs, all the nodes build the same link state table. 
A typical link state table is shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Source 
Address 
 
 
Zone radius 
 
Neighbour ID 
 
Insert time     
 
Route 
metrics       
     
     
     
 
Fig 4.4: Link state routing table maintained at each node 
 
Once the link-state table is built, each node computes the route to every other node within 
its zone by applying the Dijkstra algorithm [6] to its link state table and stores this 
information in its SIARP routing table. A typical SIARP routing table at maintained at 
node A is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
 
Destination  Address 
 
Routes 
 
Route metrics 
Y A-F-Y ............. 
T A-B-T ............. 
E A-F-E ............. 
F A-F ............. 
B A-B ............. 
 
Fig 4.5: SIARP routing table maintained at node A 
 
4.6 Route maintenance 
 
The secure zone routing protocol (SZRP) is a hybrid routing protocol. SIARP is proactive 
and SIERP is reactive in nature. SIARP doesn’t mandate for route maintenance, as the 
node mobility within a zone is periodically updated. However, route maintenance is 
required in SIERP for interzone routing. 
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For route maintenance, SIERP at each node keeps track of routes whether they are active 
or not. When there is no flow of traffic on an existing route for that route’s lifetime, the 
route is deactivated by the node. Data received on an inactive route causes nodes to 
generate an Error (ERR) message. A node generates an ERR message in either of the 
following cases: (i) if data is received on an inactive route, or (ii) the link of an active 
route is broken due to node mobility or some other reasons. The node send the ERR 
message to the source along the reverse path. All ERR messages must be signed to check 
the authenticity of the sender as well as the message. For a route between source A and 
destination X, a node M generates the ERR message for its neighbor N as follows: 
 
M→N : [ERR, IPA, IPX, certM, NM, t] | signM      
Where, signM =[ERR, IPA, IPX, certM, NM, t] SKM 
 
This message is forwarded along the path to the source without modification. A nonce 
and timestamp ensure that the ERR message is a fresh. Since the ERR messages are 
signed, malicious nodes cannot generate ERR messages for other nodes. The non-
repudiation provided by the signed ERR message allows a node to be verified as the 
source of each ERR message that it sends. The source node drops the duplicate ERR 
message with same nonce and time stamp. 
 
4.7 Analysis of Secure Zone Routing Protocol 
 
In this section, we analyze the security aspects of SZRP by evaluating its robustness in 
the presence of attacks mentioned in Section 3.3. SZRP can prevent against all types of 
attacks that include information disclosure, impersonation, modification, fabrication and 
replay of packets caused by both an external advisory and an internal compromised node.  
 
Prevention from Information Disclosure: No hop count information is present in the 
SRD or SRR packets. This prevents an external advisory or an internal compromised 
node from getting any kind of information about the network topology. Topology 
information is restricted to nodes within a zone. This is harmless as nodes accept packets 
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only after verifying the sender’s signature. Further all the data packets and the control 
packets that contain the session key are encrypted which ensures the confidentiality. 
 
Attacks involving impersonation: SZRP participants, accept only those packets that 
have been signed with a certified key issued by a CA. In intrazone routing since the 
SKREQs and SKREPs can only be signed by an authenticated source with its own private 
signature key, nodes can’t impersonate (spoof) other nodes. Interzone routing follows 
hop-by-hop authentication during route discovery and end-to-end authentication during 
the route reply phase. So it is impossible for an external node or an internal compromised 
node to impersonate an intermediate node during interzone routing. Further since the 
SRD packet is signed by the source node using its private key, it guarantees that only the 
source can initiate a route discovery process. Similarly, the SRR packets include the 
destination’s certificate and signature, ensuring that only the destination can respond to 
the route discovery. This prevents attacks where the source, the destination or any 
intermediate nodes are spoofed e.g. man-in-the-middle attack and sybil attack. 
 
Routing message Modification: SZRP specifies that all fields of LSPs, SRD and SRR 
packets remain unchanged between the source and the destination. Since all packets are 
signed by the initiating node, any alterations in transit would be immediately detected by 
intermediate nodes along the path, and the altered packets would be subsequently 
discarded. Repeated instances of altering packets could cause other nodes to exclude the 
errant node from routing. Thus, modification attacks like redirection of routing messages 
and DoS attacks are prevented. 
 
Fabrication of messages: Messages can be fabricated only by the internal compromised 
nodes with certificates. In that case, SZRP does not prevent fabrication of routing 
messages, but it does offer a deterrent by ensuring non-repudiation. A node that continues 
to inject false messages into the network may be excluded from future route computation. 
 
Replay Attacks: Replay attacks like tunneling and wormhole attacks are prevented by 
including a nonce and a timestamp with routing messages. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we presented the design of a new secure ad hoc routing protocol called 
the Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) which is based upon the concept of hybrid 
routing. We analyzed the robust of the protocol against multiple attacks in the network 
and found that, the proposed protocol gives a better solution towards achieving the 
security goals like message integrity, data confidentiality and authentication, by taking an 
integrated approach of digital signature and both the symmetric and asymmetric key 
encryption technique. In the next chapter, we present the possible implementation and 
performance evaluation of the proposed protocol through simulation work. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Simulation of  
Secure Zone Routing Protocol 
 
The performance of Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) was evaluated using Network 
Simulator-2 version 2.1b6a (NS-allinone-2.1b6a) [40]. NS-2 provides a framework for 
simulation of wired and wireless networks, including some facility for emulation. The 
NS-2 simulator is written in C++ with a Tcl shell in the front-end that uses oTcl (object-
oriented Tcl) libraries. Scenarios are run by feeding an oTcl script to the NS-2 
executable. The output can be read directly or post-processed by an interactive graphics 
viewer called NAM. Generally NS-2 has a different architecture for wireless and wired 
simulation.  Current version of NS-2 does not support any sort of security architecture. So 
for that purpose special classes were designed. 
 
This chapter describes how the proposed protocol has been simulated, the technology and 
hardware used for simulation, the network scenario and the analysis of simulation results. 
 
5.1 Simulation Setup 
 
The simulation of Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) was conducted in NS-allinone-
2.1b6a, on an Intel Pentium IV processor (2.4 GHz) and 512 MB of RAM running 
Ubuntu 7.2. To make our results as general as possible, we have simulated SZRP to 
support nodes with moderate resources. The proposed protocol has been implemented 
over the ZRP protocol specification document for NS-2, contributed by Robin Poss in 
[41], with required modifications to support the adopted security mechanisms. 
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5.1.1 Network Scenario 
 
In the studied scenario, we simulated two types of field configurations: 10 nodes 
distributed over a 700m x 700m terrain and 20 nodes over a 1200m x 1200m terrain. 
Node transmission range was taken to be 250m. The initial positions of the nodes were 
random. Node mobility was simulated according to the random waypoint mobility model 
[39], in which each node travels to a randomly selected location at a configured speed 
and then pauses for a configured pause time, before choosing another random location 
and repeating the same steps. We ran simulations for a constant node speeds of 0, 1, 5 
and 10 m/s, with pause time fixed at 30 seconds.  
 
The implementation used 802.11 MAC layer and CBR traffic over UDP. We simulated 
five CBR sessions in each run, with random source and destination pairs. Each session 
generated 500 data packets of 512 bytes each at the rate of 4 packets per second. All 
simulations were run for 150 seconds of simulated time. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 shows 
the screenshots of the simulation scenario with 10 and 20 nodes respectively.  
 
5.1.2  Security Model 
 
SZRP was simulated using a 512 bit key and 16 byte RSA digital signature. These values 
are reasonable to prevent compromises during the routing process. 
 
For the proposed protocol, we assumed a routing packet processing delay of 2ms. This 
value was obtained through field testing of the ZRP protocol implementation [41] under 
identical conditions as that of SZRP. Additionally, a digital signature generation delay of 
6.5ms and verification delay of 0.5ms was simulated for SZRP. These values were 
obtained by measuring the multiple running times of the RSA digital signature and 
verification algorithm implemented in J2SE 1.4 on a desktop computer with a Pentium IV 
processor (2.4 GHz) and 512 MB of RAM running Ubuntu Linux 7.2. Additionally, a 
random delay between 0 and 10ms was introduced before a packet is transmitted in order 
to minimize collisions.  
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Fig 5.1: Transmission between 10 Nodes distributed over a 700m x 700m terrain 
 
 
 
Fig 5.2: Transmission between 20 Nodes distributed over a 1200m x 1200m terrain 
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5.2 Performance Metrics 
 
In order to evaluate the performance of Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP), both ZRP 
and SZRP were run and compared under identical mobility patterns and traffic scenarios. 
A basic version of ZRP was used, which did not include optimizations. This enables a 
consistent comparison of results. The version of ZRP implemented here is contributed by 
Robin Poss in [41]. We used two classes of metrics to compare the performance of ZRP 
and SZRP. The first class of metrics evaluates both the protocols under a non-adversarial 
network setting, assuming all the nodes in the network to be well-behaved and benign. 
The second class of metrics was used to compare their performances under a hostile 
environment where malicious nodes are present in the network.  
 
5.2.1 Metrics used for a Non-Adversarial Environment 
 
We evaluated four performance metrics to compare the proposed protocol with ZRP 
under a trusted environment where all the nodes in the network are assumed to be benign. 
They are discussed below: 
 
 Average packet delivery fraction: This is the fraction of the data packets 
generated by the CBR sources that are delivered to the destination. This metric is 
important as it evaluates the ability of the protocol to discover routes. 
 
 Average routing load in bytes: This is the ratio of overhead control bytes to 
delivered data bytes. Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) has larger control 
overhead due to the certificate and signature embedded in the packets. For the 
calculation of this metric, the transmission at each hop along the route was 
counted as one transmission. 
 
 Average routing load in terms of packets: This metric is similar to the above, 
but here the ratio of control packet overhead to data packet overhead is calculated.  
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 Average route acquisition latency: This is the average delay between the 
sending of a secure route discovery packet by a source for discovering a route to a 
destination and the receipt of the first corresponding route reply. This includes all 
the delays caused during the route discovery and route reply phases for signature 
verification and their replacement, in addition to the normal processing of the 
packets. If a route request timed out and needed to be retransmitted, the sending 
time of the first transmission was used for calculating the latency.  
 
5.2.2 Metrics used for a Hostile Network Setting  
 
The metrics described in the previous section compare the performance of SZRP and 
ZRP when all the nodes in the network are well-behaved. We conducted additional 
experiments to determine the effect of malicious node behavior on the two protocols. For 
this, we used the field configuration of 20 nodes distributed over a 1200m x 1200m area 
and ran simulations with 20% and 30% malicious nodes for each protocol. The malicious 
nodes were selected randomly. We measured the following metric: 
 
 Percentage of Packets Dropped that passed through Malicious Nodes: This 
metric indicates the percentage of total packets dropped that traverse malicious 
nodes when using each routing protocol, in the presence of different percentages 
of malicious nodes. Assuming that all the packets that pass through a malicious or 
compromised node were altered, this metric can be calculated as follows: 
 
% of Packets  
Dropped that  
passed through  
Malicious Nodes 
 
 
The metric evaluates the degree to which the communication is secure, as packets 
passing through malicious nodes may possibly disrupt secure communication. 
= 
No. of packets dropped by the benign nodes 
that are previously generated by or passed 
through any malicious node in the network 
 
Total number of packets communicated 
100 
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5.3 Simulation Results and Analysis 
 
In this section we present and analyze the observed results for each of the performance 
metric discussed in the previous section under the network and security setup given in 
Section 5.1. The resulting data were plotted using Gnuplot 4.2.5 [42]. Each data point in 
the resulting graphs is an average of 5 simulation runs with identical configuration but 
different randomly generated mobility patterns. 
 
5.3.1 Average Packet Delivery Fraction 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the observed results for average packet delivery fraction for both the 10 
and 20 node networks. As shown in the figure, the packet delivery fraction obtained using 
SZRP is above 96% in all scenarios and almost identical to that obtained using ZRP. This 
suggests that SZRP is highly effective in discovering and maintaining routes for delivery 
of data packets, even with relatively high node mobility. 
 
 
Fig 5.3: Simulation Results – Average Packet Delivery Fraction 
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5.3.2 Average Routing Load in Bytes 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the routing load measurements for both the protocols in terms of 
number of control bytes per data bytes delivered. As shown in the figure, the byte routing 
load of Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) is higher compared to that of ZRP. For 
example, it is nearly 40% for 20 nodes moving at 5 m/s, as compared to 22% for ZRP 
with identical topology and mobility pattern. With further increase in node mobility to 10 
m/s, it increases to 75%, compared 45% for ZRP.   
 
This overhead is due to the certificate and signature embedded in the packets. The RSA 
digital signature is of 16 bytes and the certificate is 512 bytes long. Though these extra 
bytes are pure overhead they are necessary for security provisioning. Additionally, since 
ZRP has the advantage of smaller sized packets, the packet size of SZRP is not that much 
larger compared to other secure routing protocols even after inserting the security data. 
 
 
Fig 5.4: Simulation Results – Average Routing Load in bytes 
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5.3.3 Average Routing Load in Terms of Packets 
 
While the number of control bytes transmitted by SZRP is larger than that of ZRP, the 
number of control packets transmitted by the two protocols is roughly equivalent. Figure 
5.5 shows the average number of control packet transmitted per delivered data packet. 
Except for the scenario of 20 nodes moving at 1 m/s, where they exhibit some difference, 
the packet routing load for both the protocols are nearly the same for other scenarios. 
 
This is due to the fact that SZRP did not employ any extra control packets compared to 
ZRP for secure routing, except for the case of intrazone routing, which requires two 
additional control packets SKREQ and SKREP. However, with high node mobility, for 
example, when the nodes move with the speed of 5 m/s or 10 m/s, the number of times 
interzone routing carried out was significantly higher than intrazone routing. In this 
respect, the two protocols demonstrate nearly the same amount of packet overhead. 
 
 
Fig 5.5: Simulation Results – Average Routing Load in Packets 
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5.3.4 Average Route Acquisition Latency 
 
Figure 5.6 shows that the average route acquisition latency for Secure Zone Routing 
Protocol (SZRP) is approximately 1.7 times as that of ZRP. For example, for 10 nodes 
moving at 5 m/s, it is 60ms as compared to 100ms for ZRP, while for 20 nodes moving at 
10 m/s, it is nearly 135ms as compared to 75ms as in the case of ZRP.  
 
While processing SZRP routing control packets, each node has to verify the digital 
signature of the previous node, and then replace this with its own digital signature, in 
addition to the normal processing of the packet as done by ZRP. This signature 
generation and verification causes additional delays at each hop, and so the route 
acquisition latency increases.  
 
 
Fig 5.6: Simulation Results – Average Route Acquisition Latency 
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5.3.5 Percentage of Packets Dropped that Passed Through 
Malicious Nodes 
 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the results of the experiments. As shown in the figure, when using 
SZRP, a much larger fraction of packets that passed through malicious nodes were 
dropped, as compared to that of ZRP. For instance, in the presence of 30% malicious 
nodes with no node mobility, only 26% of packets that pass through malicious nodes 
were dropped when using ZRP, as compared to almost 47% when using SZRP.  
 
These results show that about 50% of packets that were possibly altered by malicious 
nodes in the network remained undetected and could potentially make their way through 
authentic nodes when using ZRP, as compared to the proposed protocol. This is a 
significant increase in the degree of security level. 
 
 
Fig 5.7: Simulation Results – Percentage of Packets Dropped that passes through 
Malicious Nodes 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
The simulation results for Secure Zone Routing Protocol under different mobility patterns 
and traffic scenarios show that the proposed protocol is as efficient as ZRP in discovering 
and maintaining routes, at the cost of using larger routing packets which result in a higher 
overall routing load, and at the cost of higher latency in route discovery because of the 
cryptographic computation that must occur. However, the impact of the overhead caused 
is almost insignificant and negligible as compared to the proposed degree of security, 
which SZRP provides compared to its other counterparts.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, we have considered the routing approaches in mobile ad hoc networks from 
the security viewpoint. We have analyzed the threats against ad hoc routing protocols and 
presented the requirements that need to be addressed for secure routing. Existing secure 
routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks are either proactive or reactive in nature; 
hence are limited in their approach in terms of providing security across diverse 
networking applications. We explored the advantages of hybrid routing in dealing with 
these limitations, where the proactive and the reactive behavior is mixed in the amounts 
that best match these operational conditions. 
 
We have presented the design and analysis of a new secure routing protocol for mobile ad 
hoc networks, called the Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP). The proposed protocol is 
hybrid in nature and based on the concept of zone routing protocol (ZRP). It provides a 
solution for secure routing in an open and managed-open environment. In designing 
SZRP, we carefully fit the inexpensive cryptographic primitives to each part of the 
protocol functionality to create an efficient protocol that is robust against multiple attacks 
in the network. The proposed protocol gives a better solution towards achieving the 
security goals like message integrity, data confidentiality and message authentication, by 
taking an integrated approach of digital signature and both the symmetric and asymmetric 
key encryption techniques.  
 
Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) is a simple protocol that supports nodes with 
moderate resources and does not require significant additional work from the nodes 
within the group. Our simulations show that SZRP is as efficient as ZRP in discovering 
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and maintaining routes, at the cost of using larger routing packets which result in a higher 
overall routing load, and at the cost of higher latency in route discovery because of the 
cryptographic computation that must occur. However, the impact of the overhead caused 
would be almost insignificant and negligible as compared to the proposed degree of 
security, which SZRP will provide to any network system, if adopted. 
 
The proposed protocol intends to provide security at IP layer. Together with existing 
approaches for securing the physical layer and MAC layer within the network protocol 
stack, the Secure Zone Routing Protocol (SZRP) provides a foundation for governing a 
secure communication system for mobile ad hoc networks. 
 
6.1 Future Works 
 
The proposed protocol presented in this thesis considers that, the certification authorities 
(CAs) are safe within the network and are free from any kind of attacks caused either by 
external advisory or internal compromised nodes. A possible extension of the work may 
include employing additional feature to SZRP so that it can handle a scenario where the 
trusted certification authorities are compromised or attacked. 
 
Additionally we have assumed that, the Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NDP) is 
implemented as a MAC layer protocol. But in some special cases the MAC layer does not 
include an implementation of NDP. In such situations the proposed protocol may be 
modified to provide the functionality of NDP at IP layer. 
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